We examine how the Kremlin uses the cultural code of the Great Patriotic War to provide soldiers with moral comfort while committing crimes, and why the narrative of "Polish imperialism" is not an amateurish invention but a deliberate strategy aimed against Poland.In this debate I argue a point that requires careful unpacking: history in today's Russia has ceased to be a science. It has become a technology. The Kremlin uses the cultural code of the Great Patriotic War not to educate but to rationalize crimes. I draw on Joseph Goebbels' diaries from 1941-1942 to show that the mechanism is identical: just as the Third Reich had to provide psychological comfort to the executioners in the death camps, today the Russian state feeds its soldiers the narrative of fighting "Ukrainian Nazis." The term "denazification" used on 24 February 2022 was not accidental. It was a deliberate move that cast the Russian soldier as the grandson of the victors of Stalingrad and sanctified his actions. We see the results in Bucha.

I also examine the phenomenon of Vladimir Medinsky, whom I call the most effective "history influencer" in the world. The Russian academic community treats him as a charlatan. But that does not prevent him from building a financial and political empire on the recycling of propagandistic content of low scholarly value. Evidence of his effectiveness is President Zelensky's reaction during negotiations, nervously batting away the "historical nonsense" coming from the Russian side. History has become a real argument in wartime diplomacy. I also analyse the direction of the Russian information system: the creation of state super-apps for surveillance, blockades of YouTube and Telegram. Paradoxically, the latter move faces business resistance from a middle class whose content monetization depends on these platforms.

I separately analyse Russia's strategy toward Poland. The narrative of the "Polish imperial gene" and the alleged desire to reclaim Lviv is not amateurism. It is a calculated play on Poland's marginal forces. The Kremlin rarely needed a majority in Poland: in 1920, in 1944, in the elections studied by Professor Paczkowski, it always looked for minority groups it could "fund up" and turn into its viceroys. The narratives about partitioning Ukraine are the contemporary fuel for such circles. I end with a pessimistic forecast: as long as Putin remains in power, the war will not end, because it is the product of his personal historical obsession. But the current conflict has already lasted longer than the Great Patriotic War, which opens space for a future "new Khrushchev."

Do Russians really believe Poland will attack them? On history as a technology of war.