Stocked Shelves, Silent People. Why Won't Russians Overthrow Putin?
I talk with Bogdan Rymanowski about why Putinism is stronger than the USSR and what really keeps Russians on the side of the regime. I show the mechanism of "history that kills": how the Russian state legitimizes war crimes by embedding them in the continuity of the fight against Nazism.
I also discuss Russia's "Polish complex," why the Kremlin is mentally preparing its society for a potential conflict with Poland, and what we can realistically expect from Russia over the coming decades.
Putinism's success does not rest on repression alone. Its foundation is a material stabilization unprecedented in Russian history, which I call "power through supermarkets." The arrival of proper shops in Russia's provincial towns, all-inclusive holidays, mortgages, a car of your own: all of this neutralized the need for political change for years. On top of that comes the unprecedented buying of army loyalty: around 200,000 Polish zlotys just for signing a contract, and a monthly salary of 5-8,000 zlotys for someone who previously earned 1,500. This system is stronger today than the USSR, because repression in it is supplemented by prosperity.
Russian historical policy works in a similar way: it offers soldiers psychological comfort while committing crimes. The narrative of continuity in the fight against Nazism, today "Ukrainian," once "German," presents aggression as a historical mission. Putin himself is a product of Soviet patriotic education, not academic reflection: his historical knowledge derives largely from serials like "The Shield and the Sword." Zorkin, the president of the Constitutional Court, once brought him a 17th-century map to "prove" Ukraine's non-existence, even though the map bore the inscription Ukraine. It is a spectacle for the older generation, but a very effective one.
Poland sits in the strategic crosshairs of this arrangement. Russian elites project their own imperial ambitions onto Warsaw: they do not believe Poland has truly accepted the 1945 borders or that it has no desire for Lviv or Vilnius. The exhibition "10 Centuries of Polish Russophobia" organized in Katyn, or the dismantling of Polish crosses at Mednoye, are not coincidences: they are the mental preparation of Russian society for a potential conflict with Poland. Lasting change in Russia requires the bankruptcy of the entire system. The pragmatic goal for Poland is not a democratic Russia, but a less aggressive one. And we may be waiting for that between 10 and 30 years.